WorldviewIDThesisIDStageThesisTextThesisTypeSourcePrimarySourceURLStatusNotes
PHYSPHYS-1MetaphysicsEverything is physical.AxiomSEP: Physicalism (opening definition)https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/CoreExtracted from SEP opening; see E-013.
PHYSPHYS-2MetaphysicsAll facts supervene on physical facts (no duplicate physical without duplicate simpliciter).LogicalConsequenceSEP: Physicalism sec 2.1 (Supervenience physicalism)https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/#SupeNecePhysVariantA common modal formulation; see E-014.
BUDBUD-1SoteriologyLiberation from suffering is the central aim; doctrinal claims serve that aim.DoctrineSEP: Buddha (opening summary)https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/buddha/CoreFrom SEP Buddha opening; see E-015.
BUDBUD-2MetaphysicsThere is no permanent, independent self.DoctrineSEP: Buddha sec 3 (Non-Self)https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/buddha/#NonSelfCoreArgument structures given; see E-016.
AVEDAVED-1MetaphysicsUltimate reality is non-dual (Brahman); multiplicity is derivative relative to it.DoctrineIEP: Advaita Vedanta (overview paragraph)https://iep.utm.edu/advaita/CoreUsed for A1.1/A1.2 disputes; see E-009/E-010.
ANATANAT-1MetaphysicsReality is exhausted by nature; there are no supernatural entities.AxiomSEP: Atheistic Naturalism - Naturalismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/CoreExtracted from Atheistic_Naturalism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-017
ANATANAT-2Epistemology/MethodThe scientific method has broad authority for investigating reality, including the “human spirit”.AxiomSEP: Atheistic Naturalism - Naturalismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/VariantExtracted from Atheistic_Naturalism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-018
ANATANAT-3MetaphysicsAll spatiotemporal entities are identical to, or metaphysically constituted by, physical entities; special domains add nothing over physical arrangements.AxiomSEP: Atheistic Naturalism - Naturalismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/ContestedExtracted from Atheistic_Naturalism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-019
CTHECTHE-1Comparative MetaphysicsMultiple traditions name “the ultimate” (e.g., Brahman, Dao, emptiness, God), but “ultimacy” is difficult to define across contexts.AxiomSEP: God and Other Ultimates - 1. Conceptual Foundations and Motivationshttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-ultimates/CoreExtracted from Classical_Theism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-020
CTHECTHE-2MethodCross-cultural comparison of “ultimates” presupposes some shared core/family resemblance; this is disputed (particularism vs. comparativism).AxiomSEP: God and Other Ultimateshttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-ultimates/VariantExtracted from Classical_Theism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-021
CTHECTHE-3MethodAny substantive definition of ultimacy risks cultural deformation; “ultimacy” may need to be a “properly vague” category to cover disparate instances.AxiomSEP: God and Other Ultimates - 1. Conceptual Foundations and Motivationshttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-ultimates/ContestedExtracted from Classical_Theism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-022
DEISMDEISM-1Epistemology/Theology“Natural religion”: core religious knowledge is inborn or can be acquired by reason.AxiomBritannica: Deismhttps://www.britannica.com/topic/deismCoreExtracted from Deism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-023
DEISMDEISM-2EpistemologyReligious knowledge is rejected insofar as it depends on revelation or church teaching.AxiomBritannica: Deismhttps://www.britannica.com/topic/deismVariantExtracted from Deism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-024
DEISMDEISM-3TheologyGod’s role is primarily creation in accordance with rational laws; after creation, God does not (or rarely) intervene in nature/human affairs (as contrasted with theism).AxiomBritannica: Deismhttps://www.britannica.com/topic/deismContestedExtracted from Deism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-025
HDETHDET-1Metaphysics/CausalityEvery event is necessitated by antecedent events/conditions together with the laws of nature (causal determinism).AxiomSEP: Determinism Hard - Causal Determinismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/CoreExtracted from Determinism_Hard.md; EvidenceExtract: E-026
HDETHDET-2MetaphysicsGiven a complete state of the world at time t and the laws of nature, the future is fixed as a matter of natural law.AxiomSEP: Determinism Hard - Causal Determinismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/VariantExtracted from Determinism_Hard.md; EvidenceExtract: E-027
HDETHDET-3MethodDeterminism must be distinguished from “predictability” and from “fate”; conflating them produces definition errors.AxiomSEP: Determinism Hardhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/ContestedExtracted from Determinism_Hard.md; EvidenceExtract: E-028
DUALDUAL-1MetaphysicsMind and body (the mental and the physical) are fundamentally different kinds of things.AxiomSEP: Dualism Cartesian - Dualismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/CoreExtracted from Dualism_Cartesian.md; EvidenceExtract: E-029
DUALDUAL-2CausalityMental and physical events causally influence each other (interactionism).AxiomSEP: Dualism Cartesian - Dualismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/VariantExtracted from Dualism_Cartesian.md; EvidenceExtract: E-030
DUALDUAL-3Contrast claimMaterialism/physicalism identifies mind with the physical; dualism rejects this identification.AxiomSEP: Dualism Cartesian - Dualismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/ContestedExtracted from Dualism_Cartesian.md; EvidenceExtract: E-031
ELIMELIM-1Philosophy of mindCommon-sense “mental processes/states” may not exist as folk psychology conceives them.AxiomSEP: Eliminative Materialismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/CoreExtracted from Eliminative_Materialism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-032
ELIMELIM-2SemanticsSome mental state terms may turn out to be empty (they refer to nothing that exists).AxiomSEP: Eliminative Materialismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/VariantExtracted from Eliminative_Materialism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-033
ELIMELIM-3MethodFolk psychology posits mental states to explain behavior; eliminativism treats this framework as a theory candidate that can be replaced/eliminated.AxiomSEP: Eliminative Materialismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/ContestedExtracted from Eliminative_Materialism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-034
EMERGEMERG-1MetaphysicsSome higher-level properties have fundamental higher-level causal powers and are not exhaustively reducible to lower-level physics.AxiomSEP: Emergentism - Emergent Propertieshttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/CoreExtracted from Emergentism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-035
EMERGEMERG-2MetaphysicsEmergence involves fundamental but lawlike novelty in observable physical patterns through time.AxiomSEP: Emergentism - Emergent Propertieshttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/VariantExtracted from Emergentism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-036
EMERGEMERG-3CausalityMany emergence theses interact with (or deny) “causal closure of the physical”.AxiomSEP: Emergentism - 1. Introductionhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/ContestedExtracted from Emergentism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-037
EPIEPI-1CausalityMental events are caused by brain events, but have no effects on physical events.AxiomSEP: Epiphenomenalismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/CoreExtracted from Epiphenomenalism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-038
EPIEPI-2Metaphysics/CausalityIf physical events always have sufficient physical causes, then distinct (non-physical) mental causes would violate physical law.AxiomSEP: Epiphenomenalismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/VariantExtracted from Epiphenomenalism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-039
EPIEPI-3MethodAny account that keeps mental causes alongside sufficient physical causes risks redundancy and an epistemology where mental causes are never needed.AxiomSEP: Epiphenomenalismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/ContestedExtracted from Epiphenomenalism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-040
EXISTEXIST-1EthicsThere is no external moral order or a priori “table of values” that determines moral choice.AxiomSEP: Existentialismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/CoreExtracted from Existentialism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-041
EXISTEXIST-2Metaphysics/MeaningIf God/moral absolutes are absent, existence is exposed as lacking objective meaning or aim (a common existentialist diagnosis).AxiomSEP: Existentialismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/VariantExtracted from Existentialism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-042
EXISTEXIST-3AgencyEven under ambiguity, human projects can be meaningful by choice/commitment rather than external guarantees.AxiomSEP: Existentialismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existentialism/ContestedExtracted from Existentialism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-043
FUNCFUNC-1Philosophy of mindMental state terms need not be meaning-equivalent to physical descriptions; functionalists aim to preserve mental vocabulary without treating it as irreducibly non-physical.AxiomSEP: Functionalism - 1. What is Functionalism?https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/CoreExtracted from Functionalism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-044
FUNCFUNC-2MethodReduction strategies often trade off meaning preservation versus theoretical/ontological simplicity.AxiomSEP: Functionalismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/VariantExtracted from Functionalism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-045
FUNCFUNC-3EpistemologyQualitative/phenomenal aspects pose special epistemological problems for functionalist reductions.AxiomSEP: Functionalism - 1. What is Functionalism?https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ContestedExtracted from Functionalism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-046
IDEALIDEAL-1MetaphysicsTime/the A-series generates contradictions in certain analyses (a driver for some idealist positions about time).AxiomSEP: Idealismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/CoreExtracted from Idealism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-047
IDEALIDEAL-2MetaphysicsSomething mental is the ultimate foundation of reality, or even exhaustive of reality (core idealist commitment).AxiomSEP: Idealismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/VariantExtracted from Idealism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-048
IDEALIDEAL-3MetaphilosophyIdealism often targets the perceived opposition between thinking and being (mind vs. world) as requiring reconciliation.AxiomSEP: Idealism - 1. Introductionhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/ContestedExtracted from Idealism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-049
NMONNMON-1MetaphysicsThe basic entities are neither mental nor physical; “mental” and “physical” are ways of construing one neutral basis.AxiomSEP: Neutral Monismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/CoreExtracted from Neutral_Monism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-050
NMONNMON-2MetaphysicsMental facts depend on (supervene on) the physical (in many contemporary reconstructions).AxiomSEP: Neutral Monismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/VariantExtracted from Neutral_Monism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-051
NMONNMON-3ExplanatoryNeutral entities can offer an elegant solution to the mind-body problem by avoiding two-substance dualism.AxiomSEP: Neutral Monismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neutral-monism/ContestedExtracted from Neutral_Monism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-052
NIHILNIHIL-1Meaning/ValueLife has no intrinsic meaning or value (existential nihilism).AxiomIEP: Nihilismhttps://iep.utm.edu/nihilism/CoreExtracted from Nihilism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-053
NIHILNIHIL-2Ethics/ValueSome nihilist strands include active negation/destruction of inherited values (as in certain readings of Nietzsche).AxiomIEP: Nihilism - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophyhttps://iep.utm.edu/nihilism/VariantExtracted from Nihilism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-054
NIHILNIHIL-3Epistemology/NormativityIf all perspectives are equally non-binding, power/arrogance can determine precedence (a critique/implication often discussed).AxiomIEP: Nihilism - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophyhttps://iep.utm.edu/nihilism/ContestedExtracted from Nihilism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-055
PANENPANEN-1Theology/MetaphysicsGod and world are inter-related: the world is “in” God and God is “in” the world.AxiomSEP: Panentheismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panentheism/CoreExtracted from Panentheism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-056
PANENPANEN-2TheologyUnlike (some) classical theism, panentheism affirms that the world can influence God.AxiomSEP: Panentheismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panentheism/VariantExtracted from Panentheism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-057
PANENPANEN-3TheologyUnlike pantheism, panentheism maintains a real non-divine identity/significance alongside divine presence.AxiomSEP: Panentheismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panentheism/ContestedExtracted from Panentheism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-058
PANPPANP-1MetaphysicsMentality is fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world.AxiomSEP: Panpsychismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/CoreExtracted from Panpsychism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-059
PANPPANP-2ExplanatoryPanpsychism is offered as a “middle way” between physicalism and dualism, aiming for a unified account of mind in nature.AxiomSEP: Panpsychismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/VariantExtracted from Panpsychism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-060
PANPPANP-3ExplanatoryPanpsychism is motivated by dissatisfaction with dualism (interaction problem) and with physicalism (consciousness-emergence problem).AxiomSEP: Panpsychismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ContestedExtracted from Panpsychism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-061
PANTHPANTH-1Theology/MetaphysicsGod is identified with the world (or the world as God’s body / God as world-mind, in some historical variants).AxiomSEP: Pantheismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pantheism/CoreExtracted from Pantheism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-062
PANTHPANTH-2TheologySome pantheisms retain a distinction between God’s unknowable essence and manifest being.AxiomSEP: Pantheismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pantheism/VariantExtracted from Pantheism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-063
PANTHPANTH-3MetaphysicsA recent variant (“logical pantheism”) identifies God with logical space / the totality of possible worlds.AxiomSEP: Pantheismhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pantheism/ContestedExtracted from Pantheism.md; EvidenceExtract: E-064
PROCPROC-1MetaphysicsBeing is dynamic; becoming/process is primary for a comprehensive account of reality.AxiomSEP: Process Philosophyhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/CoreExtracted from Process_Philosophy.md; EvidenceExtract: E-065
PROCPROC-2MetaphysicsSubstance metaphysics (static individuals/substances as primary) is rejected as a theoretical bias; processes are primary units.AxiomSEP: Process Philosophyhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/VariantExtracted from Process_Philosophy.md; EvidenceExtract: E-066
PROCPROC-3MetaphysicsReality is an assembly of interacting processes across physical, organic, social, and cognitive levels.AxiomSEP: Process Philosophyhttps://plato.stanford.edu/entries/process-philosophy/ContestedExtracted from Process_Philosophy.md; EvidenceExtract: E-067