E-026 SEP HDET - Determinism Hard (Thesis 1 Excerpt)

Exact excerpt

# Causal Determinism
_First published Thu Jan 23, 2003; substantive revision Thu Sep 21, 2023_
Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature. The idea is ancient, but first became subject to clarification and mathematical analysis in the eighteenth century. Determinism is deeply connected with our understanding of the physical sciences and their explanatory ambitions, on the one hand, and with our views about human free action on the other. In both of these general areas there is no agreement over whether determinism is true (or even whether it can be known true or false), and what the import for human agency would be in either case.
 
 
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## 1. Introduction
In most of what follows, I will speak simply of _determinism_ , rather than of _causal determinism_. This follows philosophical practice of sharply distinguishing views and theories of what causation is from any conclusions about the success or failure of determinism (cf. Earman, 1986; an exception is Mellor 1995). 
Traditionally determinism has been given various, usually imprecise definitions. This is only problematic if one is investigating determinism in a specific, well-defined theoretical context; but it is important to avoid certain major errors of definition. In order to get started we can begin with a loose and (nearly) all-encompassing definition as follows:
> Determinism: Determinism is true of the _world_ if and only if, given a specified _way things are at a time t_ , the way things go _thereafter_ is _fixed_ as a matter of _natural law_. 
The italicized phrases are elements that require further explanation and investigation, in order for us to gain a clear understanding of the concept of determinism.
The notion of determinism may be seen as one way of cashing out a historically important nearby idea: the idea that _everything can, in principle, be explained_ , or that _everything that is, has a sufficient reason for being and being as it is, and not otherwise,_ i.e., Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason. Leibniz’s PSR, however, is not linked to physical laws; arguably, one way for it to be satisfied is for God to _will_ that things should be just so and not otherwise. This does not require that physical or causal determinism hold. On the other hand, on a strict reading Leibniz’s PSR may be more demanding than determinism. Under determinism, particular facts and events are the way they are due to the laws and the particular facts of how things stood at an earlier time, for example at the beginning of time. But there need be no answer to the question “Why were things just _so_ at the beginning of time?”, and hence no _complete_ sufficient reason for all facts and events.[[1](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/notes.html#note-1)]
Since the first clear articulations of the concept of determinism, there has been a tendency among philosophers to believe in the truth of some sort of determinist doctrine. There has also been a tendency, however, to confuse determinism proper with two related notions: _predictability_ and _fate._